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#### Obama’s strong -- leverage makes GOP obstructionism on immigration unsustainable

Jeff Mason, Reuters, 10/19/13, Analysis: Despite budget win, Obama has weak hand with Congress , health.yahoo.net/news/s/nm/analysis-despite-budget-win-obama-has-weak-hand-with-congress

Democrats believe, however, that Obama's bargaining hand may be strengthened by the thrashing Republicans took in opinion polls over their handling of the shutdown.

"This shutdown re-emphasized the overwhelming public demand for compromise and negotiation. And that may open up a window," said Ben LaBolt, Obama's 2012 campaign spokesman and a former White House aide.

"There's no doubt that some Republican members (of Congress) are going to oppose policies just because the president's for it. But the hand of those members was significantly weakened."

If he does have an upper hand, Obama is likely to apply it to immigration reform. The White House had hoped to have a bill concluded by the end of the summer. A Senate version passed with bipartisan support earlier this year but has languished in the Republican-controlled House.

"It will be hard to move anything forward, unless the Republicans find the political pain of obstructionism too much to bear," said Doug Hattaway, a Democratic strategist and an adviser to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign.

"That may be the case with immigration - they'll face pressure from business and Latinos to advance immigration reform," he said.

#### Plan is perceived as being soft on Mexico—drains capital and specifically derails immigration passage

Shear ’13 [Michael. Politics for the New York Times. “In Latin America, US Shifts Focus from Drug War to Economy” 5/5/13 NYT]

Last week, Mr. Obama returned to capitals in Latin America with a vastly different message. Relationships with countries racked by drug violence and organized crime should focus more on economic development and less on the endless battles against drug traffickers and organized crime capos that have left few clear victors. The countries, Mexico in particular, need to set their own course on security, with the United States playing more of a backing role. That approach runs the risk of being seen as kowtowing to governments more concerned about their public image than the underlying problems tarnishing it. Mexico, which is eager to play up its economic growth, has mounted an aggressive effort to play down its crime problems, going as far as to encourage the news media to avoid certain slang words in reports. “The problem will not just go away,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue. “It needs to be tackled head-on, with a comprehensive strategy that includes but goes beyond stimulating economic growth and alleviating poverty. “Obama becomes vulnerable to the charge of downplaying the region’s overriding issue, and the chief obstacle to economic progress,” he added. “It is fine to change the narrative from security to economics as long as the reality on the ground reflects and fits with the new story line.” Administration officials insist that Mr. Obama remains cleareyed about the security challenges, but the new emphasis corresponds with a change in focus by the Mexican government. The new Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December vowing to reduce the violence that exploded under the militarized approach to the drug war adopted by his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. That effort left about 60,000 Mexicans dead and appears not to have significantly damaged the drug-trafficking industry. In addition to a focus on reducing violence, which some critics have interpreted as taking a softer line on the drug gangs, Mr. Peña Nieto has also moved to reduce American involvement in law enforcement south of the border. With friction and mistrust between American and Mexican law enforcement agencies growing, Mr. Obama suggested that the United States would no longer seek to dominate the security agenda. “It is obviously up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States,” he said, standing next to Mr. Peña Nieto on Thursday in Mexico City. “But the main point I made to the president is that we support the Mexican government’s focus on reducing violence, and we look forward to continuing our good cooperation in any way that the Mexican government deems appropriate.” In some ways, conceding leadership of the drug fight to Mexico hews to a guiding principle of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy, in which American supremacy is played down, at least publicly, in favor of a multilateral approach. But that philosophy could collide with the concerns of lawmakers in Washington, who have expressed frustration with what they see as a lack of clarity in Mexico’s security plans. And security analysts say the entrenched corruption in Mexican law enforcement has long clouded the partnership with their American counterparts. Putting Mexico in the driver’s seat on security marks a shift in a balance of power that has always tipped to the United States and, analysts said, will carry political risk as Congress negotiates an immigration bill that is expected to include provisions for tighter border security. “If there is a perception in the U.S. Congress that security cooperation is weakening, that could play into the hands of those who oppose immigration reform,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, a counternarcotics expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Realistically, the border is as tight as could be and there have been few spillovers of the violence from Mexico into the U.S.,” she added, but perceptions count in Washington “and can be easily distorted.” “Drugs today are not very important to the U.S. public over all,” she added, “but they are important to committed drug warriors who are politically powerful.” Representative Michael T. McCaul, a Texas Republican who is chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, has warned against the danger of drug cartels forming alliances with terrorist groups. “While these threats exist, you would be surprised to find that the administration thinks its work here is done,” he wrote in an opinion article for Roll Call last month, pressing for more border controls in the bill. The Obama administration has said any evidence of such cooperation is very thin, but even without terrorist connections, drug gangs pose threats to peace and security. Human rights advocates said they feared the United States would ease pressure on Mexico to investigate disappearances and other abuses at the hands of the police and military, who have received substantial American support. The shift in approach “suggests that the Obama administration either doesn’t object to these abusive practices or is only willing to raise such concerns when it’s politically convenient,” said José Miguel Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch’s Americas division. Still, administration officials have said there may have been an overemphasis on the bellicose language and high-profile hunts for cartel leaders while the real problem of lawlessness worsens. American antidrug aid is shifting more toward training police and shoring up judicial systems that have allowed criminals to kill with impunity in Mexico and Central America. United States officials said Mr. Obama remains well aware of the region’s problems with security, even as he is determined that they not overshadow the economic opportunities. It is clear Mr. Obama, whatever his words four years ago, now believes there has been too much security talk. In a speech to Mexican students on Friday, Mr. Obama urged people in the two countries to look beyond a one-dimensional focus on what he called real security concerns, saying it is “time for us to put the old mind-sets aside.” And he repeated the theme later in the day in Costa Rica, lamenting that when it comes to the United States and Central America, “so much of the focus ends up being on security.” “We also have to recognize that problems like narco-trafficking arise in part when a country is vulnerable because of poverty, because of institutions that are not working for the people, because young people don’t see a brighter future ahead,” Mr. Obama said in a news conference with Laura Chinchilla, the president of Costa Rica.

#### Obama’s capital key – Boehner

Bill Scher, The Week, 10/18/13, How to make John Boehner cave on immigration , theweek.com/article/index/251361/how-to-make-john-boehner-cave-on-immigration

Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) generally adheres to the unwritten Republican rule that bars him from allowing votes on bills opposed by a majority of Republicans, even if they would win a majority of the full House.

But he's caved four times this year, allowing big bills to pass with mainly Democratic support. They include repealing the Bush tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans; providing Hurricane Sandy relief; expanding the Violence Against Women act to better cover immigrants, Native Americans, and LGBT survivors of abuse; and this week's bill raising the debt limit and reopening the federal government.

Many presume the Republican House is a black hole sucking President Obama's second-term agenda into oblivion. But the list of Boehner's past retreats offers a glimmer of hope, especially to advocates of immigration reform. Though it has languished in the House, an immigration overhaul passed with bipartisan support in the Senate, and was given a fresh push by Obama in the aftermath of the debt limit deal.

The big mystery that immigration advocates need to figure out: What makes Boehner cave? Is there a common thread? Is there a sequence of buttons you can push that forces Boehner to relent?

Two of this year's caves happened when Boehner was backed up against hard deadlines: The Jan. 1 fiscal cliff and the Oct. 17 debt limit. Failure to concede meant immediate disaster. Reject the bipartisan compromise on rolling back the Bush tax cuts, get blamed for jacking up taxes on every taxpayer. Reject the Senate's three-month suspension of the debt limit, get blamed for sparking a global depression. Boehner held out until the absolute last minute both times, but he was not willing to risk blowing the deadline.

A third involved the response to an emergency: Hurricane Sandy. Conservative groups were determined to block disaster relief because — as with other federal disaster responses — the $51 billion legislative aid package did not include offsetting spending cuts. Lacking Republican votes, Boehner briefly withdrew the bill from consideration, unleashing fury from New York and New Jersey Republicans, including Gov. Chris Christie. While there wasn't a hard deadline to meet, disaster relief was a time-sensitive matter, and the pressure from Christie and his allies was unrelenting. Two weeks after pulling the bill, Boehner put it on the floor, allowing it to pass over the objections of 179 Republicans.

The fourth cave occurred in order to further reform and expand a government program: The Violence Against Women Act. The prior version of the law had been expired for over a year, as conservatives in the House resisted the Senate bill in the run-up to the 2012 election. But after Mitt Romney suffered an 18-point gender gap in his loss to Obama, and after the new Senate passed its version again with a strong bipartisan vote, Boehner was unwilling to resist any longer. Two weeks later, the House passed the Senate bill with 138 Republicans opposed.

Unfortunately for immigration advocates, there is no prospect of widespread pain if reform isn't passed. There is no immediate emergency, nor threat of economic collapse.

But there is a deadline of sorts: The 2014 midterm elections.

If we've learned anything about Boehner this month, it's that he's a party man to the bone. He dragged out the shutdown and debt limit drama for weeks, without gaining a single concession, simply so his most unruly and revolutionary-minded members would believe he fought the good fight and stay in the Republican family. What he won is party unity, at least for the time being.

What Boehner lost for his Republicans is national respectability. Republican Party approval hit a record low in both the most recent NBC/Wall Street Journal poll and Gallup poll.

Here's where immigration advocates have a window of opportunity to appeal to Boehner's party pragmatism. Their pitch: The best way to put this disaster behind them is for Republicans to score a big political victory. You need this.

A year after the Republican brand was so bloodied that the Republican National Committee had to commission a formal "autopsy," party approval is the worst it has ever been. You've wasted a year. Now is the time to do something that some voters will actually like.

There's reason to hope he could be swayed. In each of the four cases in which he allowed Democrats to carry the day, he put the short-term political needs of the Republican Party over the ideological demands of right-wing activists.

Boehner will have to do another round of kabuki. He can't simply swallow the Senate bill in a day. There will have to be a House version that falls short of activists' expectations, followed by tense House-Senate negotiations. Probably like in the most formulaic of movies, and like the fiscal cliff and debt limit deals, there will have to be an "all-is-lost moment" right before we get to the glorious ending. Boehner will need to given the room to do all this again.

But he won't do it without a push. A real good push.

#### Immigration reform key to semiconductors

Toohey 12

(Brian, SIA President, May 24, 2012, “TechElect Advances Proposals to Create and Sustain American Jobs”http://www.semiconductors.org/blog/techelect\_advances\_proposals\_to\_create\_and\_sustain\_american\_jobs/?print=y)

A new nonpartisan campaign called TechElect, launched by the Information Technology Industry Council (ITI), is bringing together America’s technology and innovation leaders to promote the issues that are important to our industries and to share ideas with the presidential campaigns. TechElect’s top priorities – outlined in a document titled “Six Steps to Jobs, Prosperity and Innovation” – align with many of the core priorities of the semiconductor industry. For example, TechElect supports boosting math, science, and engineering skills in our students and protecting America’s technological leadership through strategic investments in scientific research. SIA strongly advocates for government investments in both STEM education and research funding – two of the fundamental building blocks of our industry’s future. TechElect also encourages immigration reform that allows the world’s best and brightest minds to stay in America so they can create products and jobs here. Our industry has long supported this effort, and SIA was pleased to see Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas) introduce legislation that would reform the immigration policy that is causing the U.S. to lose many job creators to competitors abroad. Last week, I was pleased to participate in TechElect’s first conference call, during which I discussed advancing the priorities that will expand our industry and boost the economy. Here are some of the topics I covered: The semiconductor industry is a great American success story. Semiconductors were invented in America, and the U.S. still leads the industry today in terms of innovation, manufacturing and design. Today, semiconductors are one of America’s top exports, and the U.S. is the leading provider of semiconductor technology to the rest of the world. The semiconductor industry has helped build the major technology breakthroughs of the last 50 years, and our greatest potential lies ahead. Semiconductors create jobs and drive our economy. Our industry employs almost 400,000 Americans directly, and semiconductor technology enables millions of additional high-tech jobs in the U.S. We’ve just scratched the surface of our potential. Eight of the top 20 U.S. corporate patent recipients are semiconductor companies, showing that the rapid pace of innovation across our industry is unrivaled. Long-term, basic research – performed at universities and funded by the industry and the federal government – is critical to sustaining the pipeline of discoveries that fuel our industry and the economy. That’s why our industry invests $20 billion in research and development annually. That’s 17 percent of total sales, which is one of the top rates of any industry.

With smart government policies – including investments in basic research, corporate tax reform, and high-skilled immigration reform – the semiconductor industry can continue to create jobs, drive economic growth and develop the technologies needed to solve our most pressing challenges.

**Semiconductors are key to US nuclear modernization**

**Chandratre et al 7**

(V.B. Chandratre et al 7, Menka Tewani, R.S. Shastrakar, V. Shedam, S. K. Kataria and P. K. Mukhopadhyay Electronics Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre “AN APPROACH TO MODERNIZING NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION: SILICON-BASED SENSORS, ASIC AND HMC” October, <http://www.barc.ernet.in/publications/nl/2007/200710-2.pdf>)

Modernization of nuclear instrumentation is pursued for realizing the goal of compact portable nuclear instruments, detector mount electronics and related instrumentation that can be designed, developed and manufactured, to mitigate contemporary instrumentation challenges. The activity aims at indigenous design and development of crucial components of nuclear instrumentation. Efforts are also undertaken to develop the critical microelectronics technologies to fulfill the gaps in nuclear instruments “ end to end”. The activity’s objective has been fulfilled by working in close collaboration with semiconductor foundries and HMC (Hybrid Micro Circuits) facilities. Various ASIC, sensors, IP cores, HMC, display devices and critical instrumentation modules developed, are discussed. The design and development of nuclear instruments require a variety of high performance components and sensors. Till recently these components were available and activity based on this approach has grown mature, with good expertise in related areas but has availability and obsolescence issues. As the technologies have moved up, various competing devices, techniques and technologies are available today. It’s important and as well prudent to catch up with these cutting edge developments, for a very strong reason that we have not been able to catch up with previous technology movements. Technology updates are difficult and have higher lead times with steeper learning curve. The Electronics Division has taken a modest initiative in fulfilling the gap in this area. Care has been taken to develop critical instrumentation by an approach of “mix and match”, integrating the newer development in the existing instrumentation on the basis of merit and requirements. Nuclear instrumentation has been a strong driver for technology developments worldwide. The low / medium energy instrumentation requirements we meet fairly with combination of NIM, CAMAC, FASTBUS and VME-based instrumentation. With use of the sensors of higher granularity, higher event rate, imaging and tracking requirements coupled with complex trigger mechanism, the approach has changed to low power detector mount electronics or monolithic sensor with electronics. Rapid developments in semiconductor technology have aided in realizing this concept.

**Loss of US nuclear primacy causes global nuclear war**

**Caves 10**

(John P. Caves Jr., Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University, January 2010, “Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent,” Strategic Forum, No. 252)

Perceptions of a compromised U.S. nuclear deterrent as described above would have profound policy implications, particularly if they emerge at a time when a nuclear-armed great power is pursuing a more aggressive strategy toward U.S. allies and partners in its region in a bid to enhance its regional and global clout. A dangerous period of vulnerability would open for the United States and those nations that depend on U.S. protection while the United States attempted to rectify the problems with its nuclear forces. As it would take more than a decade for the United States to produce new nuclear weapons, ensuing events could preclude a return to anything like the status quo ante. The assertive, nuclear-armed great power, and other major adversaries, could be willing to challenge U.S. interests more directly in the expectation that the United States would be less prepared to threaten or deliver a military response that could lead to direct conflict. They will want to keep the United States from reclaiming its earlier power position. Allies and partners who have relied upon explicit or implicit assurances of U.S. nuclear protection as a foundation of their security could lose faith in those assurances. They could compensate by accommodating U.S. rivals, especially in the short term, or acquiring their own nuclear deterrents, which in most cases could be accomplished only over the mid- to long term. A more nuclear world would likely ensue over a period of years. Important U.S. interests could be compromised or abandoned, or a major war could occur as adversaries and/or the United States miscalculate new boundaries of deterrence and provocation. At worst, war could lead to state-on-state employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on a scale far more catastrophic than what nuclear-armed terrorists alone could inflict.

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#### Oil balanced slightly above $100 now, but it’s tenuous – market shift causes price decrease

Sampson 9/26 (Pamela, AP Business Writer, “Oil Dips Below $103 as Diplomacy on Syria Advances”, ABC News, 9/26/13, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/oil-price-hangs-month-low-20379334>)

Oil prices fell Friday, a day after the U.N. Security Council made progress in the quest to get Syria to relinquish its chemical weapons.¶ Benchmark oil for November delivery fell 57 cents to $102.46 per barrel at late afternoon Bangkok time in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange.¶ The council's five permanent members on Thursday agreed to a resolution calling for Syria to get rid of its chemical weapons. That helped ease fears of an escalation in Syria's civil war since the U.S. has been threatening to attack Syria in retaliation for what Washington says was a chemical gas attack by forces loyal to President Bashar Assad against civilians in suburban Damascus.¶ The prospect of an attack, and the potential for a disruption in oil supply routes, caused oil prices to spike in recent weeks. Prices have gradually fallen in recent days as diplomacy over Syria advanced. The progress at the U.N. on Thursday maintained the downward trend on the price of oil, said Ken Hasegawa, energy analyst at Newedge Brokerage in Tokyo.¶ Upbeat news about the U.S. economy pushed prices higher Thursday. The contract for benchmark crude gained 37 cents Thursday to close at $103.03 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Oil had dropped $5.41, or 5 percent, over the five previous trading sessions.¶ Oil prices rose as data showed that the number of Americans seeking unemployment benefits fell 5,000 last week to a seasonally adjusted 305,000, the second-lowest level in six years. The U.S. economy, meanwhile, was confirmed to have grown an annualized 2.5 percent in the April-June period.¶ Brent crude, the benchmark for international crudes used by many U.S. refineries, fell 33 cents to $108.88 a barrel on the ICE Futures exchange in London.

#### Oil prices will stay high now because of Mexico production downturn—plan causes major drop in oil prices by jumpstarting Mexican production

Alter, 12 [DIANE ALTER](http://moneymorning.com/author/dalter/), Contributing Writer, Money Morning, “[Oil Prices Promise to Head Higher As Mexican Production Dwindles](http://moneymorning.com/2012/08/24/oil-prices-promise-to-head-higher-as-mexican-production-dwindles/),” August 24, 2012, http://moneymorning.com/2012/08/24/oil-prices-promise-to-head-higher-as-mexican-production-dwindles/

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Mexican oil production reached a peak of 3.2 million barrels a day in 2008. And by 2011, it wasn't even producing 3 million barrels a day. Since then oil production has slipped to 2.5 million barrels a day. Worse still, Mexico could actually become a net importer of oil within a decade if it cannot find fresh discoveries to make up for the 25% production drop since 2004 and fails to change its current policies. Higher Oil Prices Worldwide Mexico is currently ranked No. 7 on the list of the world's top oil producers, so less Mexican oil production would also mean higher oil prices worldwide. The loss of Mexico's 1 million barrels a day in exports over an extended period would be a greater blow than the total lost due to sanctions on Iran. While the effects of Mexico's lagging oil production are clear, the causes are more complex. The root of the problem is years of neglect and a government-enforced monopoly. Nationalized in 1938, Mexico's oil industry has prohibited oil behemoths like Exxon Mobil (NYSE: [XOM](http://www.google.com/finance?q=XOM)), BP (NYSE ADR: [BP](http://www.google.com/finance?q=bp)) and others from taking any sizable stake in the country's oil operations. If it allowed more investments from international oil companies, Mexico could revive production, industry analysts say. But that won't be easy. Petroleos Mexicancos, PEMEX, has sole control of the Mexican oil industry and doles out over 32% of its revenue to Mexico's government. But while the Mexican government likes the oil revenue, it has failed to re-invest enough money back into the industry. Mexican lawmakers have long resisted providing PEMEX with the funds needed to find new sources of crude.

#### Russia is on the brink—$100 key to prevent complete collapse

Whitmore 13 (Brian, Senior Correspondent in RFE/RL's Central Newsroom, covering ... security, energy and military issues and domestic developments in Russia, “After The Storm: Trends To Watch In Russia In 2013”, January 02, 2013, The Power Vertical)

It began with a roar and it ended with a whimper. As 2012 wound down in Russia, the soaring expectations for change that accompanied the civic awakening and mass protests at the year’s dawn had clearly faded. But the social, economic, and political forces that spawned them will continue to shape the landscape well into the new year. A fledgling middle class remains hungry for political change, splits still plague the ruling elite over the way forward, and a fractious opposition movement continues to struggle to find its voice. With the Kremlin unable to decisively squelch the mounting dissent and the opposition unable to topple President Vladimir Putin, Russia has entered an uneasy holding pattern that has the feel of an interlude between two epochs. "I don't think we are at the end of the Putin era, but we are at the beginning of the end," says longtime Russia-watcher Edward Lucas, international editor of the British weekly "The Economist" and author of the recently published book "Deception." With economic headwinds on the horizon, generational conflict brewing, and new political forces developing, Russian society is changing -- and changing rapidly. But the political system remains ossified. So what can we expect in 2013? Below are several trends and issues to keep an eye on in the coming year. The Oil Curse: Energy Prices And The Creaking Welfare State If 2012 was all about politics, 2013 will also be about economics. The Russian economy, the cliche goes, rests on two pillars -- oil and gas. And both will come under increasing pressure as the year unfolds. World oil prices, currently hovering between $90 and $100 per barrel, are expected to be volatile for the foreseeable future. And any sharp drop could prove catastrophic for the Russian economy. Energy experts and economists say Russia's budget will only stay balanced if oil prices remain between $100 and $110 per barrel. Five years ago, the figure needed for a balanced budget was $50 to $55.

#### Extinction

Oliker 2 (Olga and Tanya Charlick-Paley, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, Assessing Russia’s Decline – Trends and Implications for the United States and the U.S. Air Force, RAND)

The preceding chapters have illustrated the ways in which Russia’s decline affects that country and may evolve into challenges and dangers that extend well beyond its borders. The political factors of de- cline may make Russia a less stable international actor and other factors may increase the risk of internal unrest. Together and sepa- rately, they increase the risk of conflict and the potential scope of other imaginable disasters. The trends of regionalization, particu- larly the disparate rates of economic growth among regions com- bined with the politicization of regional economic and military inter- ests, will be important to watch. The potential for locale, or possibly ethnicity, to serve as a rallying point for internal conflict is low at pre- sent, but these factors have the potential to feed into precisely the cycle of instability that political scientists have identified as making states in transition to democracy more likely to become involved in war. These factors also increase the potential for domestic turmoil, which further increases the risk of international conflict, for instance if Moscow seeks to unite a divided nation and/or demonstrate globally that its waning power remains something to be reckoned with. Given Russia’s conventional weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries with it an increased risk of nuclear weapons use, and Russia’s demographic situation increases the potential for a major epidemic with possible implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russia’s civilian and military nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use, create a real risk of proliferation of weapons or weapons materials to terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident at one of Russia’s nuclear power plants or other facilities. These elements touch upon key security interests, thus raising serious concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the likelihood of conflict—internal or otherwise—and the general de- terioration that Russia has in common with “failing” states raises se- rious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging crisis. A crisis in large, populous, and nuclear-armed Russia can easily affect the interests of the United States and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the United States, whether alone or as part of a larger coalition, could be asked to send military forces to the area in and around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios that could call for U.S. involvement. A wide range of crisis scenarios can be reasonably extrapolated from the trends implicit in Russia’s decline. A notional list includes: • Authorized or unauthorized belligerent actions by Russian troops in trouble-prone Russian regions or in neighboring states could lead to armed conflict. • Border clashes with China in the **Russian Far East** or between Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, or another neighbor could escalate into interstate combat. • Nuclear-armed terrorists based in Russia or using weapons or materials diverted from Russian facilities could threaten Russia, Europe, Asia, or the United States. • Civil war in Russia could involve fighting near storage sites for nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and agents, risking large-scale contamination and humanitarian disaster. • A nuclear accident at a power plant or facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. • A chemical accident at a plant or nuclear-related facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. • Ethnic pogroms in south Russia could force refugees into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or Ukraine. Illustrative Scenarios • Economic and ethnic conflicts in Caucasus could erupt into armed clashes, which would endanger oil and gas pipelines in the region. • A massive ecological disaster such as an earthquake, famine, or epidemic could spawn refugees and spread illness and death across borders. • An increasingly criminalized Russian economy could create a safe haven for crime or even terrorist-linked groups. From this base, criminals, drug traders, and terrorists could threaten the people and economies of Europe, Asia, and the United States. • Accelerated Russian weapons and technology sales or unautho- rized diversion could foster the **proliferation** of weapons and weapon materials to rogue states and nonstate terrorist actors, increasing the risk of nuclear war. This list is far from exhaustive. However significant these scenarios may be, not all are relevant to U.S. military planning. We therefore applied several criteria to the larger portfolio of potential scenarios, with an eye to identifying the most useful for a more detailed discus- sion. First, only those scenarios that involve a reasonable threat to U.S. strategic interests were considered. Second, while it is impor- tant to plan for the unexpected, it is equally crucial to understand the likelihood of various events. We thus included a range of probabili- ties but eliminated those that we considered least plausible. Third, we only chose scenarios for which the Western response would likely be military or would rely on considerable military involvement. Lastly, we wanted to select a variety of situations, ones that created differing imperatives for the U.S. government and its Air Force, rather than scenarios, which, while equal in significance, present fairly similar problems. We therefore offer the following four story- lines as illustrative, if far from exhaustive, of the types of challenges that would be presented by operations on or near Russian territory.

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#### Text: The United States federal government ought to enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Brazil on whether The Export Import Bank of the United States should substantially increase financing for advanced biofuels in Mexico with the possibility of minor modifications by the Brazilian government.

#### Prior binding consultation key to U.S.-Brazil relations

Einaudi 11—a Distinguished Visiting f ellow in the Center for Strategic r esearch, i nstitute for n ational Strategic Studies, at the n ational Defense University. He is also a Member of the a dvisory Council of the Brazil i nstitute at the Woodrow Wilson i nternational Center for Scholars. (Luigi, “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement,” March 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf

A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved work¬ing with Washington than against it.¶ The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping in-terests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention with China, India, Rus-sia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particu¬larly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically nec¬essary to highlight differences even when interests are simi-lar. But both countries should make every effort to develop a habit of “permanent consultation” in an effort to coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies often may differ.¶ A first operational step, therefore, is for both coun-tries to hold regular policy-level consultations, increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, all types of trade, the environment, space, and the development of internation¬al law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This orga¬nization hampers the exchange of information and con¬sultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bi¬laterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.

#### Relations solve global prolif

Trinkunas & Bruneau 12 (Harold & Thomas, Ph.D. at Naval Post Graduate School, Center on Contemporary conflict, “US Brazil Workshop on Global and Regional Security,” December 2012, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA574567&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

Brazilian participants also noted the particular alignment of domestic constituencies regarding issues such as MERCOSUR and UNASUR, which they saw as demonstrating that Brazil was a consolidated democracy that had to respond to domestic political and economic interests in much the same way that the United States government did. The United States and Brazil also look very similar in their relationship with the region, one participant said. If we actually look at the interests of United States and Brazil, they are very convergent. One Brazilian participant also added that, like the United States, Brazil is happy to retreat back to unilateralism. Brazilian participants repeatedly emphasized that Brazil is uniquely qualified to play the role of international peacemaker due to their peaceful traditions, the strength of their diplomacy, and their experience in reducing tensions during international crises. Brazilians also stressed that as a consolidated free market democracy, Brazil is inherently a responsible power in the international arena. They disagreed with the characterization of Brazil as a ‘spoiler’, a position held by some U.S. observers of global nonproliferation efforts (albeit not by the U.S. participants in this dialogue). Again and again Brazilian participants emphasized their responsible and mature behavior in important international issues, including nuclear ones. The dialogue participants from outside of the region agreed that Brazil has acquired a good reputation for its skilled diplomacy. One U.S. participant predicted that Brazil would eventually join the expanded UN Security Council as a permanent member. The Brazilians considered the U.S. and Brazil to be natural partners in international nonproliferation efforts, and both sides agreed that the international nonproliferation regime was in crisis. They offered different explanations, however, for the roots of the regime crisis. A participant from within the region added that it is difficult for Brazil and the U.S. to be on the same page or even debate nuclear issues because the two countries comes from very different ends of the nuclear spectrum. Participants observed that the NPT regime is in the midst of a legitimacy crisis. One participant said that from an institutional point of view, the original design of the regime left it unable to adapt to changes that have taken place in the international system since the Cold War. Some U.S. participants expressed optimism that the NPT has been bolstered by the Obama administration’s support for the NPT. A change in both attitude and policy from the administration has fostered a new sense of hope in the NPT’s utility. This participant added that only by fully engaging other members of the NPT can the U.S. and Brazil hope to make the non-proliferation regime stronger.

#### Extinction

Victor AUtgoff**,** Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival,p.87.90

Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

The status quo is always an option – proving the CP worse does not justify the plan. Logical decision-making is the most portable skill.

And, presumption remains negative—the counterplan is less change and a tie goes to the runner.

## off

**Imaginaries of climatic apocalypticism are profoundly depoliticizing—appeals to a singular human fate objectify nature and ensure nothing changes.**

**Swyngedouw ‘13**

Erik, Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester in its School of Environment and Development, “Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, 2013 Vol. 24, No. 1, 918

A flood of literature on the relationship between apocalyptic imaginaries, popular culture, and politics has excavated the uses and abuses of revelatory visions (Skrimshire 2010; Calder Williams 2011). Despite the important differences between the transcendental biblical use of the apocalypse and the thoroughly material and socio-physical ecological catastrophes-to-come, the latter, too, **depoliticize matters**. As Alain Badiou contends: [T]he rise of the ‘‘rights of Nature’’ **is a contemporary form of the opium** **for the people**. It is an only slightly camouflaged religion: the millenarian terror, concern for everything save the properly political destiny of peoples, **new instruments for control of everyday life, the obsession with hygiene, the fear of death and catastrophes . . . It is a gigantic operation in the depoliticization of subjects.** (Badiou 2008, 139) Environmental problems are indeed commonly staged as **universally threatening** **to** the survival of **humankind**, announcing the premature termination of civilization as we know it and sustained by what Mike Davis (1999) aptly called ‘‘**ecologies of fear**.’’ Much of the discursive matrix through which the presentation of the environmental condition we are in is quilted systematically by the continuous invocation of fear and danger, the specter of ecological annihilation, or at least seriously distressed socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near future. The nurturing of fear, in turn, is sustained in part by a particular set of **phantasmagorical imaginations** that serve to reinforce the seriousness of the situation (Katz 1995). The apocalyptic imaginary of a world without water or at least with endemic water shortages; **ravaged by hurricanes** whose intensity is amplified by climate change; pictures of scorched land as global warming shifts the geo-pluvial regime and the spatial variability of droughts and floods; icebergs that disintegrate; alarming **reductions in biod**iversity as species disappear or are threatened by extinction; **post-apocalyptic images of nuclear wastelands;** the threat of peak-oil; the devastations raked by wildfires, tsunamis, spreading diseases like SARS, Avian Flu, Ebola, or HIV\***all these imaginaries of a Nature out of synch**, **destabilized, threatening, and out of control** are paralleled by equally disturbing images of a society that continues piling up waste, pumping CO2 into the atmosphere, recombining DNA, deforesting the earth, etc . . . In sum, our ecological predicament is sutured by millennialism fears sustained by an apocalyptic rhetoric and representational tactics, and by a series of performative gestures signalling an **overwhelming**, **mind-boggling danger\***one that threatens to undermine the very coordinates of our everyday lives and routines and may shake up the foundations of all we took and take for granted. Of course, apocalyptic imaginaries have been around for a long time as an integral part of Western thought, first of Christianity and later emerging as the underbelly of fast-forwarding technological modernization and its associated doomsday thinkers. However, present day millennialism preaches an apocalypse without the promise of redemption. Saint John’s biblical apocalypse, for example, found its redemption in God’s infinite love, while relegating the outcasts to an afterlife of permanent suffering. The proliferation of modern apocalyptic imaginaries also held up the promise of redemption: the horsemen of the apocalypse, whether riding under the name of the proletarian, technology, or capitalism, could be tamed with appropriate political and social revolutions. **The environmental apocalypse**, **in contrast**, **takes different forms**. It is not immediate and total (but slow and painful), not revelatory (it does not announce the dawn of a new rose-tinted era); no redemption is promised (for the righteous ones), and there are no outcasts. Indeed, if the boat goes done, the first-class passengers will also drown. As Martin Jay argued, while traditional apocalyptic versions still held out the hope for redemption, for a ‘‘second coming,’’ for the promise of a ‘‘new dawn,’’ environmental apocalyptic imaginaries are ‘‘leaving behind any hope of rebirth or renewal . . . in favor of an **unquenchable fascination** **with being on the verge of an end that never comes’’** (Jay 1994, 33). The emergence of new forms of millennialism around the environmental nexus is indeed of a particular kind that promises neither redemption nor realization. As Klaus Scherpe insists, this is not simply apocalypse now, but **apocalypse forever**. It is a vision that does not suggest, prefigure, or expect the necessity of an event that will alter the course of history (Scherpe 1987). Derrida (referring to the nuclear threat in the 1980s) sums this up most succinctly: ‘‘here, precisely, is announced\*as promise or as threat\*an apocalypse without apocalypse, an apocalypse without vision, without truth, without revelation . . . without message and without destination, without sender and without decidable addressee . . . an apocalypse beyond good and evil’’ (Derrida 1982). The environmentally apocalyptic future, forever postponed, neither promises redemption nor does it possess a name, a positive designation. The attractions of such an apocalyptic imaginary are related to a series of characteristics. In contrast to standard left arguments about the apocalyptic dynamics of unbridled capitalism, I would argue that **sustaining and nurturing apocalyptic imageries are an integral and vital part of the new cultural politics of capitalism for which the management of fear is a central leitmotiv** (Badiou 2007) **and provides** part of **the cultural support for** a process of **post-politicization** (Swyngedouw 2010a). At the symbolic level, **apocalyptic imaginaries are extraordinarily powerful in disavowing or displacing social conflict and antagonisms**. Apocalyptic imaginations are decidedly populist and foreclose a proper political framing. Or in other words, the presentation of climate change as a global humanitarian cause produces a **thoroughly depoliticized imaginary**, one that does not revolve around choosing one trajectory rather than another, or identifies clear adversaries in a political process; it is one that is not articulated with specific political programs or socio-ecological projects or transformations. It insists that we have to make sure that radical technomanagerial and socio-cultural transformations, organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute, are initiated that retrofit the climate (Swyngedouw 2007). In other words, we have to change radically, **but within the contours of the existing state of the situation**\*‘‘the partition of the sensible’’ in Rancie`re’s (1998) words, **so that nothing really has to change**.

**The impact is unending structural violence and apocalyptic environmental destruction along the periphery**

**Swyngedouw ‘13**

Erik, Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester in its School of Environment and Development, “Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, 2013 Vol. 24, No. 1, 918

What we are witnessing is a strange reversal whereby the specter of economic and/or ecological catastrophe is mobilized primarily by the **elites** **from the global North**. Neither Prince Charles nor Al Gore can be accused of revolutionary zeal. For them, the ecological condition is\*correctly of course\*understood as potentially threatening to civilization as we know it. At the same time, their image of a dystopian future functions as a **fantasy** that sustains a practice of adjusting things today such that civilization as we know it (**neoliberal capitalism**) can continue for a bit longer, spurred on by the conviction that radical change can be achieved without changing radically the contours of capitalist eco-development. The imaginary of crisis and potential collapse produces an **ecology of fear**, danger, and uncertainty while reassuring ‘‘the people’’ (or, rather, the population) that the techno-scientific and socio-economic elites have the necessary tool-kit to readjust the machine **such that things can stay basically as they are.** What is of course radically disavowed in their pronouncements is the fact that many people in many places of the world **already live in the socio-ecological catastrophe**. **The ecological Armageddon is already a reality**. While the elites nurture an apocalyptic dystopia that can nonetheless be avoided (**for them),** the **majority of the world already lives ‘‘within the collapse of civilization’’** (The Invisible Committee 2009). **The Apocalypse is indeed a combined and uneven one, both in time and across space** (see Calder Williams 2011).

**Our alternative is to vote negative to unconditionally reject climate catastrophism.**

**The alternative actualizes radical politics within specific environments—that’s crucial to the creation of new social relations that solve the aff.**

**Swyngedouw ‘13**

Erik, Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester in its School of Environment and Development, “Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, 2013 Vol. 24, No. 1, 918

Against this cynical stand, the third, and for me proper, leftist response to the apocalyptic imaginary is twofold and cuts through the deadlock embodied by the first two responses. To begin with, **the revelatory promise of the apocalyptic narrative has to be fully rejected.** In the face of the cataclysmic imaginaries mobilized to assure that the apocalypse will NOT happen (if the right techno-managerial actions are taken), the only reasonable response is ‘‘Don’t worry (Al Gore, Prince Charles, many environmental activists . . ..), you are really right, the environmental apocalypse WILL not only happen, **it has already happened, IT IS ALREADY HERE.**’’ Many are already living in the post-apocalyptic interstices of life, whereby the fusion of environmental transformation and social conditions, **render life ‘‘bare.’’** The fact that the socio-environmental imbroglio has already passed the point of no return has to be **fully asserted**. The socio-environmental Armageddon is already here for many; it is not some distant dystopian promise mobilized to trigger response today. Water conflicts, struggles for food, environmental refugees, etc. testify to the socio-ecological predicament that choreographs everyday life for the majority of the world’s population. Things are already too late; they have always already been too late. There is no Arcadian place, time, or environment to return to, no benign socio-ecological past that needs to be maintained or stabilized. Many already live in the interstices of the apocalypse, albeit a combined and uneven one. **It is only within the realization of the apocalyptic reality of the now that a new politics might emerge.** The second gesture of a proper leftist response is to reverse the order between the universal and the particular that today dominates the catastrophic political imaginary. This order maintains that salvaging the particular historical-geographical configuration we are in depends on re-thinking and re-framing the human environment articulation **in a universal sense**. We have to change our relationship with nature so that capitalism can continue somehow. Not only does this argument to preserve capitalism guarantee the prolongation of the combined and uneven apocalypse of the present, **it forecloses considering fundamental change** **to the actually existing unequal forms of organizing the society**-**environment relations.** Indeed, the apocalyptic imaginary is one that generally still holds on to a dualistic view of nature and culture. The argument is built on the view that humans have perturbed the ecological dynamic balance in ways inimical to human (and possibly non-human) long-term survival, and the solution consists broadly in bringing humans (in a universal sense) back in line with the possibilities and constraints imposed by ecological limits and dynamics. A universal transformation is required in order to maintain the present. And this can and should be done through managing the present particular configuration. This is the message of Al Gore or Prince Charles and many other environmental pundits. A left socio-environmental perspective has to insist that we need to transform this universal message into a particular one. The historically and geographically specific dynamics of capitalism have banned an external nature radically to a sphere beyond earth. On earth, there is no external nature left. It is from this particular historical-geographical configuration that **a radical politics of transformation has to be thought and practiced. Only through the transformation of the particular socio-ecological relations of capitalism can a generic egalitarian, free, and common re-ordering of the human/non-human imbroglios be forged.**

## exim

#### No impact to warming

Taylor 12 (James, Forbes energy and environment writer, 3/14/2012, "Shock Poll: Meteorologists Are Global Warming Skeptics", www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2012/03/14/shock-poll-meteorologists-are-global-warming-skeptics/)

A recent survey of American Meteorological Society members shows meteorologists are skeptical that humans are causing a global warming crisis. The survey confirms what many scientists have been reporting for years; the politically focused bureaucratic leadership of many science organizations is severely out of touch with the scientists themselves regarding global warming issues. According to American Meteorological Society (AMS) data, 89% of AMS meteorologists believe global warming is happening, but only a minority (30%) is very worried about global warming. This sharp contrast between the large majority of meteorologists who believe global warming is happening and the modest minority who are nevertheless very worried about it is consistent with other scientist surveys. This contrast exposes global warming alarmists who assert that 97% of the world’s scientists agree humans are causing a global warming crisis simply because these scientists believe global warming is occurring. However, as this and other scientist surveys show, believing that some warming is occurring is not the same as believing humans are causing a worrisome crisis. Other questions solidified the meteorologists’ skepticism about humans creating a global warming crisis. For example, among those meteorologists who believe global warming is happening, only a modest majority (59%) believe humans are the primary cause. More importantly, only 38% of respondents who believe global warming is occurring say it will be very harmful during the next 100 years. With substantially fewer than half of meteorologists very worried about global warming or expecting substantial harm during the next 100 years, one has to wonder why environmental activist groups are sowing the seeds of global warming panic. Does anyone really expect our economy to be powered 100 years from now by the same energy sources we use today? Why immediately, severely, and permanently punish our economy with costly global warming restrictions when technological advances and the free market will likely address any such global warming concerns much more efficiently, economically and effectively? In another line of survey questions, 53% of respondents believe there is conflict among AMS members regarding the topic of global warming. Only 33% believe there is no conflict. Another 15% were not sure. These results provide strong refutation to the assertion that “the debate is over.” Interestingly, only 26% of respondents said the conflict among AMS members is unproductive. Overall, the survey of AMS scientists paints a very different picture than the official AMS Information Statement on Climate Change. Drafted by the AMS bureaucracy, the Information Statement leaves readers with the impression that AMS meteorologists have few doubts about humans creating a global warming crisis. The Information Statement indicates quite strongly that humans are the primary driver of global temperatures and the consequences are and will continue to be quite severe. Compare the bureaucracy’s Information Statement with the survey results of the AMS scientists themselves. Scientists who have attended the Heartland Institute’s annual International Conference on Climate Change report the same disconnect throughout their various science organizations; only a minority of scientists believes humans are causing a global warming crisis, yet the non-scientist bureaucracies publish position statements that contradict what the scientists themselves believe. Few, if any, of these organizations actually poll their members before publishing a position statement. Within this context of few actual scientist surveys, the AMS survey results are very powerful.

**Failed state theory is wrong**

**Couch, 2012** (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)

A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 **Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems** implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. This absence may reflect an assessment that **numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail**. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 **Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure**.

#### No China-Russia war

Lilia Shevtsova, Carnegie Endowment Senior Fellow, 2/11/13, Russia and China: Is the World Ready for Their Decline?, www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1381

However, it is also hard to imagine that in a crisis Moscow would suddenly decide to take on China (notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Union and China did have a military confrontation over a territorial dispute in 1969). The elite in Moscow is busy provoking anti-Western sentiment, but it will stop short of doing the same with respect to China for fear of retaliation. Today it seems equally improbable that the Beijing leadership would lose its mind. But even if the common sense prevails in both capitals, other actors may stoke the fire—the Central Asian countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan, or North Korea. How would they react to a systemic crisis in either or both nuclear powers? Could they become the indirect cause of the clash of the falling giants? In any event, the failure of the two nuclear superpowers that consolidated the vast Eurasian space may trigger the disintegration of that space. The world order that came about as a result of World Word II and that is still maintained by the UN Security Council will also begin to fragment.

#### Empirics prove it won’t escalate

Chicago Tribune, 10/15/04

China and Russia settled the last of their decades-old border disputes Thursday during a visit to Beijing by President Vladimir Putin, signing an agreement fixing their 2,700-mile-long border for the first time. The struggle over border areas resulted in violent clashes in the 1960s and 1970s, when strained Sino-Soviet relations were at their most acrimonious, feeding fears abroad that the conflict could erupt into nuclear war. Beijing and Moscow had reached agreements on individual border sections as relations warmed in the past decade. But a stretch of river and islands along China's northeastern border with Russia's Far East had remained in dispute.

## Mexico

#### No risk of Asia war – Peaceful China and multilateral institutions

Bitzinger and Desker, 9

[Richard, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Barry, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, “ Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival | vol. 50 no. 6 | December 2008–January 2009

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely. This is not to say that the region will not undergo significant changes. The rise of China constitutes perhaps the most significant challenge to regional security and stability – and, from Washington’s vantage point, to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The United States increasingly sees China as its key peer challenger in Asia: China was singled out in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as having, among the ‘major and emerging powers … the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States’.1 Although the United States has been the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Second World War, it will probably not remain so over the next 25 years. A rising China will present a critical foreign-policy challenge, in some ways more difficult than that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.2 While the Soviet Union was a political and strategic competitor, China will be a formidable political, strategic and economic competitor. This development will lead to profound changes in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. Still, the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is more likely; the emergence of a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. While Beijing is increasingly prone to push its own agenda, defend its interests, engage in more nationalistic – even chauvinistic – behaviour (witness the Olympic torch counter-protests), and seek to displace the United States as the regional hegemon, this does not necessarily translate into an expansionist or warlike China. If anything, Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions of international relations, particularly by co-opting these to meet its own purposes. This ‘soft power’ process can be described as an emerging ‘Beijing Consensus’ in regional international affairs. Moreover, when the Chinese military build-up is examined closely, it is clear that the country’s war machine, while certainly worth taking seriously, is not quite as threatening as some might argue.

**Status quo solves relations**

**FNL 7/5** [July 5, 2013. Fox News Latino. “U.S. Wants More Intelligence Cooperation With Mexico, White House Report States” http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/07/05/us-wants-more-intelligence-cooperation-with-mexico-white-house-report-states/#ixzz2aos85oqW]

A newly released White House report on the U.S. border with Mexico highlights the Obama administration's strategic shift toward forgoing a closer working relationship with its southern neighbor. This, despite recent restrictions by Enrique Peña Nieto's government on who American intelligence services can contact in Mexico. The White House's 2013 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy illustrated nine points that focus on interdiction, tackling drug cartels along the border, halting money laundering, building up stronger communities and strengthening ties between the two nations in terms of counternarcotics. “The U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship **continues to grow** based on strong, multi-layered institutional ties,” the report stated. “Based on principles of shared responsibility, mutual trust, and respect for sovereign independence, the two countries’ efforts have built confidence that continues to transform and strengthen the bilateral relationship in 2013 and beyond.” While the U.S. report touts a need for greater cooperation, new Mexican security policies could hamper that. A recent decision by the Mexican government has ordered a halt in direct communications between American intelligence agencies and their counterparts south of the border. Now instead of directly consulting local law enforcement, agencies like the DEA and FBI will have to contact Mexico's Interior Ministry before being passed along through the proper channels. Intelligence sharing, however, was a major talking point when President Barack Obama met with his Mexican counterpart back in May. Despite scarce details about the meeting, the two leaders discussed border security and the use of drones along the 1,954-mile shared border. Peña Nieto downplayed the notion that the new, more centralized arrangement would damage its security partnership with the United States. He said Obama agreed during their private meeting earlier in the day to "cooperate on the basis of mutual respect" to promote an efficient and effective strategy. "I think the U.S. government wants to make sure that Peña Nieto is on the same page as Obama, that he wants to pursue the cartels as consistently and aggressively as [former Mexican President] Calderón did during his presidency," Alex Sanchez, a security analyst at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, told ABC News. Even as the Obama administration hopes that Peña Nieto will continue to go on the offensive against the drug cartels in Mexico, the report suggests a more humanitarian approach to the drug war. Besides counternarcotics efforts, a solid portion of the report concerns community building measures along the border, ways to deal with substance abuse and violence, as well as health and education programs. “The crime and breakdown in public health and safety that affect many border communities has a close nexus with substance use —including abuse of alcohol and other drugs— can have a far-reaching effect on the resilience of communities,” the report stated. “Heavily Hispanic communities along the border have been particularly hard hit.” The report’s focus on community building seems to go along with Peña Nieto’s strategy in combating the drug war. Instead of the “kingpin” approach that his predecessor Felipe Calderón took, which focused on apprehending or killing high-ranking cartel members, Peña Nieto has moved to a plan to reduce the levels of violence in the country and bolster trust of law enforcement among the populace. The report has some analysts hopeful that there will be **better working relations** between the U.S. and Mexico, especially in light of the new rules concerning U.S. intelligence agencies. “The election of Peña Nieto sparked vocal concerns among U.S. political leaders over his stated desire to move priorities away from arrests and drug seizures, and towards violence reduction, and there have also been reports of tensions between the incoming government and U.S. officials over the level of U.S. involvement in Mexican security policies,” the Latin American intelligence website Insight Crime stated. “However, the U.S. strategy displays no sign of this friction, only expressing a desire to increase cooperation, which despite the public murmuring is likely to be the case.”

#### No risk of nuclear terror

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

## Agriculture

#### Food prices low – weather

USA Today 13

Food prices drop slowly, even with good weather

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2013/02/21/weather-key-to-next-years-food-prices/1936049/

Despite a punishing drought across much of the country last year, farmers should see yields rise this year if the weather cooperates, and the prices they get for their crops will stay at their current levels, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's chief economist said Thursday. Inflation is likely to push food prices at the grocery store up 3% to 4% in the coming year, Joseph Glauber said at the 2013 USDA Agricultural Outlook Forum in Arlington, Va. But if rain comes, supplies will increase, and eventually that will mean lower prices for consumers. "The outlook for 2013 in a nutshell is we're expecting a rebound in yield," Glauber said. "We should see record production in corn and soy, which will mean improved profits for livestock, dairy and poultry." Spring rains will be "very critical" to how well U.S. farmers do in the growing season, he said. He said there's no reason to expect another dry year and projected a "dramatic rebound" for the corn crop. Because of the drought, the corn crop of 10.7 billion bushels was 4 billion bushels short of projections. Better weather should mean lower prices for crops such as corn, soybeans and wheat, which would mean lower production costs for meat, poultry and dairy because feed would be cheaper.

#### Biotech solves

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Ajogwu, Department of Soil and Environmental Management, Anyigba.

http://scholarsresearchlibrary.com/aasr-vol4-iss2/AASR-2012-4-2-906-913.pdf

The positive correspondence between agricultural bi otechnology and food security has for long been est ablished. Early in December 199, the 54 th UN general assembly session declared that the appl ication of agricultural biotechnology in developing countries provides viab le opportunities for improving productivity and inc reasing production capacity in the agricultural sector (Mug abe, 2000). And in connection to the green revolut ion, (Santaniello, 2005) pointed out that “agricultural biotechnology is the major technological innovation to be made Ohikere J. Z. et al Arch. Appl. Sci. Res., 2012, 4 (2):906-913 Scholars Research Library available to formers after the end of the green rev olution”. These positions at once identify and rec ommend the application of biotechnology in agriculture as an a pparatus for addressing food insecurity in developi ng countries. Asserting the linkage between agricultural biotechn ology and food security, it was pointed out that a gricultural biotechnology promises to play a crucial role in im proving agricultural productivity and reducing the environmental impact of agriculture leading to agricultural susta inability and food security in many regions of the world. Indeed, agricultural biotechnology has enlarged and increas e the abilities of science to overcome genetic and environmental constraints which impose serious limitations on the capacities of crops and animals to yield their opt imum outputs. Through the tools of agricultural biotechnology, pl ant breeders can select single genes that produce a desired trait and move them unto another plant easily as the gene tic barrier between these plants is completely over come. Thus, through agricultural biotechnology, the yields of c ertain plants can be increase and even their nutrie nts content and nutritional values improved in a much easier and fa ster way than via the conventional plant breeding m ethods. Applying the techniques of agricultural biotechnolo gy in combination with other scientific techniques the insert and innate productivity potentials of some of our crops can be harnessed and unleashed to aid the nation a s a whole to realize its dream of food security. Taking into co gnizance the three pillars of food security in Nige ria in the following ways:

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### Overview

**Structural violence is the framing impact.**

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

**Independently, the demand to return nature to balance inscribes a self-hatred that culminates in auto-annihilation and extinction**

Jean **Baudrillard**, Professor of Sociology and Philosophy @ Multiple universities, **2007**, “Darwin’s Artificial Ancestors and the Terroristic Dream of the Transparency of the Good” *International Journal of Baudrillard* Studies Volume 4, number 2

All this has been brought about by the highly dubious way in which the concept of nature has evolved. What was initially matter became energy. The modern discovery of nature consists in its liberation as energy and in a mechanical transformation of the world. After having first been matter, and then energy, nature is today becoming an interactive subject. It is ceasing to be an object, but this is bringing it all the more surely into the circuit of subjection. A dramatic paradox, and one which also affects human beings: we are much more compromised when we cease to be objects and become subjects. This is a trick that was pulled on us long ago in the name of absolute liberation. Let's not pull the same one on nature. For the ultimate danger is that, in an interactivity built up into a total system of communication, there is no other; there are only subjects – and, very soon, only subjects without objects. All our problems today as civilized beings originate here: not in an excess of alienation, but a disappearance of alienation in favour of a maximum transparency between subjects. An unbearable situation, all the more so for the fact that, in foisting on nature the status of a subject in law, we are also foisting on it all the vices of subjectivity, decking it out, in our own image, with a bad conscience, with nostalgia (for a lost object which, in this case, can only be us), with a range of drives in particular, an impulse for revenge. The “**balance**” we hear so much of in ecology (“out of balance”) is not so much that of planetary resources and their exploitation as the metaphysical one between subject and object. Now, that metaphysical subject/object balance is being upset and the subject, armed as he is with all the technologies of advanced communication (technologies on whose horizon the object has disappeared), is the beneficiary. Once that balance is disrupted, it inevitably sparks violent reactions on the part of the object. Just as individuals counter the transparency and virtual responsibility inflicted on them as subjects with unexplainable acts, acts of resistance, failure, delinquency and collective disorder, so nature counters this enforced promotion, this consensual, communicational black mail, with various forms of behaviour that are radically other, such as catastrophes, upheavals, earthquakes and chaos. It would seem that nature does not really feel a sense of responsibility for itself, nor does it react to our efforts to give it one. We are, admittedly, indulging in a (bad) ecological conscience and attempting, by this **moral violence**, to stave off possible violence on nature's part. But if, by offering it the status of subject, we are handing it the same poisoned chalice as we gave to the decolonized nations, we ought not to be surprised if it behaves irrationally merely so as to assert itself as such. Contrary to the underlying Rousseauist ideology, which argues that the profound nature of the liberated subject can only be good and that nature itself, once emancipated, cannot but be endowed with natural equilibrium and all the ecological virtues, there is nothing more ambiguous or perverse than a subject. Now, nature is also germs, viruses, chaos, bacteria and scorpions, significantly eliminated from Biosphere 2 as though they were not meant to exist. Where are the deadly little scorpions, so beautiful and so translucent, which one sees in the Desert Museum not far away, scorpions whose magical sting certainly performs a higher, invisible – but necessary – function within our Biosphere 1: the incarnation of evil, of the venomous evil of chance, the mortal innocence of desire (the desire for death) in the equilibrium of living beings? What they have forgotten is that what binds living beings together is something other than an ecological, biospherical solidarity, something other-than the homeostatic equilibrium of a system: it is the cycle of metamorphoses. Man is also a scorpion, just as the Bororo are *araras* and, left to himself in an expurgated universe, he becomes, himself, a scorpion.[5](http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol4_2/v4-2-baudrillard.html#_edn5) In short, it is not by expurgating evil that we liberate good. Worse, by liberating good, we also liberate evil. And this is only right: it is the rule of the symbolic game. It is the inseparability of good and evil which constitutes our true equilibrium, our true balance. We ought not to entertain the illusion that we might separate the two, that we might cultivate good and happiness in a pure state and expel evil and sorrow as wastes. That is the terroristic dream of the transparency of good, which very quickly ends in its opposite, the transparency of evil. We must not reconcile ourselves with nature. It seems that the more the human race reconciles itself with nature, the less it is reconciled with itself. Above and beyond the violence it inflicts on others, there is a violence specific to the human race in general, a violence of the species against itself in which it treats itself as a residue, as a survivor – even in the present – of a coming catastrophe. As if it too were ready to repent of an evolution which has brought it such privileges and carried it to such extremes. This is the same conjuncture as the one to which Canetti refers, in which we stepped out of history, except that here we have not stepped out of history, but have passed a point beyond which nothing is either human or inhuman any longer and what is at stake, which is even more immense, is the tottering of the species into the void. It is quite possible that, in this process, **the species** itself **is commencing its own disappearance**, either **by** disenchantment with – or **ressentiment towards – itself,** or out of a deliberate inclination which leads it here and now to manage that disappearance as its destiny. Surreptitiously, in spite of our superiority (or perhaps because of it), we are carrying over on to our own species the treatment we mete out to the others, all of which are virtually dying out. In an animal milieu which has reached saturation point, species are spontaneously dissuaded from living. The effects produced by the finite nature of the earth, for the first time contrasting violently with the infinity of our development, are such that our species is automatically **switching over to collective suicide.** Whether by external (nuclear) violence or internal (biological) virulence. We are subjecting ourselves as a human species to the same experimental pressure as the animal species in our laboratories. Man is without prejudice: he is using himself as a guinea-pig, just as he is using the rest of the world, animate or inanimate. He is cheerfully gambling with the destiny of his own species as he is with that of all the others. In his blind desire to know more, he is programming his own destruction with the same ease and ferocity as the destruction of the others. He cannot be accused of a superior egoism. He is sacrificing himself, as a species, to an unknown experimental fate, unknown at least as yet to other species, who have experienced only natural fates. And, whereas it seemed that, linked to that natural fate, there was something like an instinct of self-preservation – long the mainstay of a natural philosophy of individuals and groups – this experimental fate to which the human species is condemning itself by unprecedented, artificial means, this scientific prefiguring of its own disappearance, sweeps away all ideas of a self-preservation instinct. The idea is, indeed, no longer discussed in the human sciences (where the focus of attention would seem, rather, to be on the death drive) and this disappearance from the field of thought signals that, beneath a frenzy for ecological conservation which is really more to do with nostalgia and remorse, a wholly different tendency has already won out, the sacrificing of the species to boundless experimentation.

### FW

**Our framework is crucial to politicizing the environment—this is the a priori question of the ballot.**

**Swyngedouw ‘13**

Erik, Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester in its School of Environment and Development, “Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, 2013 Vol. 24, No. 1, 918

The Anthropocene is just another name for insisting on Nature’s death. This cannot be unmade, however hard we try. The past is forever closed and the future\* including nature’s future\*is radically open, up for grabs. Indeed, the affirmation of the historical-geographical co-production of society WITH nature radically politicizes nature, makes nature enter into the domain of contested socio-physical relations and assemblages. We cannot escape ‘‘producing nature’’; rather, it forces us to make choices about what socio-natural worlds we wish to inhabit. It is from this particular position, therefore, that the environmental conundrum ought to be approached so that a qualitative transformation of **BOTH** **society AND nature** has to be envisaged. This perspective moves the gaze from thinking through a ‘‘politics of the environment’’ to ‘‘**politicizing the environment’’** (Swyngedouw 2011; 2012). The human world is now an active agent in shaping the non-human world. This extends the terrain of the political to domains hitherto left to the mechanics of nature. The non-human world becomes ‘‘enrolled’’ in a process of politicization. And that is precisely what needs to be fully endorsed. The Anthropocene opens up a terrain whereby different natures can be contemplated and actually co-produced. And the struggle over these trajectories and, from a leftist perspective, the process of the egalitarian socio-ecological production of the commons of life **is precisely what our politics are all about.** Yes, the apocalypse is already here, but do not despair, let us fully **endorse the emancipatory possibilities** of apocalyptic life.

**We straight turn all of their warming education/debate good arguments**

**Szerszynski 10**

Bronislaw Szerszynski, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at Lancaster University, UK, where he also works in the Centre for the Study of Environmental Change (CSEC) and the ESRC Centre for the Economic and Social Aspects of Genomics (Cesagen), 2010 "Reading and Writing the Weather : Climate Technics and the Moment of Responsibility" Theory Culture Society 27: 9

Of course, at one level it is extremely important to conduct such assessments of the effectiveness, feasibility, safety and ethical implications of different climate technics. **But there are** also **questions which lie at a deeper level than whether each method will ‘work’ or whether it is ethically right** – questions which concern **how they put us into relation with the weather and with the ethico-political demands of the moment.** Such ques- tions do not need putting from outside, as it were; **they are latent within the very story that society is telling itself, the story within which the ideas of ‘solving’ or ‘fixing’ climate change** (Socolow et al., 2004; Kunzig and Broecker, 2008) **are made intelligible**. **In the dominant reading of the climate story, scientific analysis has passed the baton firmly and legitimately to technological response.** Yet, I will argue, this reading is rendered unstable by problematic relations of indistinction that obtain between its key elements – between problem, diagnosis and cure. Firstly, climate technics occupy an ambiguous role in the story, analagous to that of writing in Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Plato’s Phaedrus in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’. In order to argue for the dangers of writing, Plato employed an Egyptian myth in which the god Thoth commends the art of writing to King Thamus of Egypt by saying it will act as a recipe (pharmakon) for memory and wisdom. However, Derrida points out that pharmakon in Greek can mean remedy, recipe, and poison (Derrida, 1981b: 75, 71), and that all of those meanings can be seen as operative in Plato’s text and as conditioning Thamus’s rejection of the gift. Derrida uses this to illustrate the way that the differantial archi-structure of language conditions Plato’s text, forcing him to say things that go against any intended meaning. Similarly aporetic relations can be seen in the way that climate technics are offered as recipes for correcting our unwitting intervention into the environ- ment with a witting counter-intervention. Such pre-emptive orientations to futurity, developed most strikingly in American military strategy since 9/11, always involve an attempt to survive a feared future by becoming ‘immersed in its conditions of emergence, to the point of actualizing it ourselves’ (Cooper, 2006: 125). Geoengineering technologies in particular echo this logic of pre-emption, committing us as they do to a deeper complicity in processes of anthropogenic climate change in the guise of promising to halt it. Secondly, **even emission-reduction technologies, when framed as means to ‘save the planet’ by helping to stabilize the climate, can be seen as relying on a particular historical bringing-into-relation of the reading and the writing of the weather.** A key assumption behind such strategies is the idea that a doubling of CO2 levels from the preindustrial level represents a limit of climate safety. Yet this is a conventional framing for climate change research that dates back to the work of Arrhenius in the 19th century and has little independent justification. Indeed, Boykoff, Frame and Randalls argue that the very concept of ‘climate stabilization’ became dominant in the 1980s for extra-scientific reasons, has outlived its initial usefulness, and in its promise of politically manageable long-term targets is diverting political energy away from more radical responses (Boykoff et al., 2010). More generally, **policymakers have seemed to favour those forms of climate science that do not overemphasize the probability of abrupt climate change, and that are thus more tractable within an incremental policy-response framework** (Shackley and Wynne, 1995: 227). Similarly, the dominance in climate change science of the mathematical climate models known as General Circulation Models (GCMs) over other methods cannot be explained in purely scientific terms (Shackley and Wynne, 1995: 218, 225–6). However, such models fitted the particular rhetorical needs of a period when global warming was highly contested, by operating with what Lorraine Daston calls an aperspectival version of objectivity, which by focusing on the elimination of individual and group idiosyncracies in the description of natural phenomena may ‘sacrifice deeper or more accurate knowledge to the demands of communicability’ (Daston, 1992: 600). **Contemporary global climate science is a classic case of a regulatory science – a mutual construction between scientific research and policy needs** (Jasanoff, 1990; Shackley and Wynne, 1995). It is the way that it was increasingly oriented around a highly specific knowledge-constitutive interest in predicting and controlling the future that gave it its current power to orient action in certain kinds of ways (Habermas, 1971: 306). To put this another way, **climate science’s action-orienting power derives not from its objectivity, autonomy and disinterestedness, but from its always-already presumption of application**. Our relation with the weather has been pulled towards a certain kind of reading that constitutes it as a code that can be mastered and controlled. The metabolic relation of humanity and nature has been understood only in narrowly causal terms, obscuring the disseminative drift of meaning and thus tilting us inexorably towards the idea of climate change as a problem that can be solved rather than an opening to be responded to (Hulme, 2009). Thirdly, these relations of indistinction between science and technol- ogy were already prepared in the origins of modern meteorology. The rela- tionship between science and technology is not simply the apparent truism that the prior acquisition of knowledge is a temporal precondition of its application. This particular epistemic and temporal mapping of the relation- ship serves a ‘constitutional’ role whereby both sides – the disinterested- ness of science and the interestedness of technology – serve to legitimate the other. But as Heidegger argued, although, chronologically speaking, modern science precedes modern technology, metaphysically speaking technology is prior; technology beckons and shapes science, calls it into being in order to make nature ‘report’ in a technological way, as a ‘calcula- ble coherence of forces’ (Heidegger, 2003[1954]: 258). Climate science, while alerting us to the disruption of our relations with our environment, at the same time also conditions our response in a way that means that the baton has always already been passed to technology. There are resources for understanding this ‘enframing’ of climate in Derrida’s ‘grammatological’ conceptualization of writing. In Of Grammatology, Derrida challenged the conventional understanding of the relationship between writing and speech, and thereby the whole of metaphysical thought since Plato. In the logocentric tradition of the West, with its metaphysical commitment to ideas of self-identical presence as paradigmatically experi- enced in the experience of hearing one’s own voice, there is a long tradition of seeing logos, thought, as itself writing. In this tradition there is literal writing, in the form of marks on surfaces; and there is metaphorical writing, inscribed in the soul and in nature.9 There is thus fallen, finite, artificial, instituted writing, parole, that takes us away from presence; and there is divine, natural writing, langue, the self-present meaning towards which words point. This notion of a pure writing in ‘the book of nature’, under- stood to have been written by God, was central to the birth of the idea of a scientific knowledge of nature that was immune to the vagaries and errors of literal, fallen writing. Derrida is concerned neither to reproduce nor to reverse the hier- archical distinction between divine/natural and fallen writing, but rather to problematize the distinction between the two. For Derrida the impurities and aporias of writing – that all signs are merely signs of other signs, the arbitrariness of the signifier-signified relationship, and the deferral of meaning along chains of difference – are true of semiosis in general. Derrida thus radically extends the concept of writing, using the term archi-writing (archi-écriture) to name this structure of difference and deferral that is at once the condition of possibility and the constant disruption of all meaning (Derrida, 1976). A grammatological approach unsettles the conventional understanding of the science-technology dichotomy, by exposing how the latter maps onto a Platonic division between a good, natural writing, co- incident with truth, and a bad writing, subject to the vagaries of finitude, interests and failure. In particular, **the atmospheric framing of weather which emerges with modern, scientific meteorology involves a complicity with this distinction, and thus with metaphysics**.10 Scientific meteorology contrasted starkly with earlier readings of the weather, grounded as they were in quite different knowledge-constituting interests. Dating back at least as far as the classical period in the ancient world, the popular ‘weather-signs’ tradition as catalogued in Virgil’s Georgics involved the passing-on in rural cultures of maxims concerning local seasonal weather patterns. Elite meteorology, with its origins in the work of Aristotle in the classical period, focused by contrast on the systematic speculative explanation of ‘meteors’: unusual events observed high up in the sublunary sphere such as comets, storms, shooting stars or the aurora borealis. In the early modern period discrete and extreme natural phenom- ena continued to be the focus of both learned and popular interest. In 17th century England, provincial men of letters developed a form of meteorology which combined the chorographic description of the unique characteristics of localities with the subjective description of unusual local atmospheric events (Jankovic, 2000: 44; see also Golinski, 2007). In popular discourse about the weather, ‘weather-wising’ about seasonal regularities coexisted with a fascination for aerial prodigies, which involved reading them as signs of ‘divine concern for the moral fate of mankind, manifested as promisings, forewarnings, or reprimands’ (Jankovic, 2000: 37). But such ways of reading the weather soon became out of step with the changing metabolic organization of society. The gradual replacement of a land-based society by one based on industry, commerce and disembed- ded social relations undermined the relevance of agrarian ‘weather wising’, local provincial knowledge or religious hermeneutics (Jankovic, 2000: 157). The physico-chemical approach of the new meteorology that emerged from the late 18th century fitted far better with the emerging society, and gradu- ally displaced earlier readings of the weather. This involved a radical trans- formation in the meteorological conceptualization of the weather, in which the latter became conceived as reducible, in principle, to the regular operation of natural laws (Jankovic, 2000; Golinski, 2007). The key concept was the idea of ‘atmosphere’, and the prime foci of research the develop- ment of instrumentation and the recreation of weather in the laboratory. Meteorology became a science of measurements, instruments and standard- ization, utilizing concepts such as air pressure, humidity, chemistry and condensation. As Jankovic puts it, ‘[i]nstrumental measurements were justified because the atmosphere was conceivable as a laboratory’ (2000: 166). Further developments in meteorology depended to a large extent on the emergence of sophisticated statistical methods of manipulating and combining these standardized measurements. These were particularly crucial in the development of scientific climatology, for example in the scientific classification of world climates by Wladimir Köppen in the 19th

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## PTX

### OV

#### Turns agriculture – lack of labor means even if they access innovation it can’t solve

Alfonso Serrano 12, Bitter Harvest: U.S. Farmers Blame Billion-Dollar Losses on Immigration Laws, Time, 9-21-12, http://business.time.com/2012/09/21/bitter-harvest-u-s-farmers-blame-billion-dollar-losses-on-immigration-laws/

The Broetjes and an increasing number of farmers across the country say that a complex web of local and state anti-immigration laws account for acute labor shortages. With the harvest season in full bloom, stringent immigration laws have forced waves of undocumented immigrants to flee certain states for more-hospitable areas. In their wake, thousands of acres of crops have been left to rot in the fields, as farmers have struggled to compensate for labor shortages with domestic help.¶ “The enforcement of immigration policy has devastated the skilled-labor source that we’ve depended on for 20 or 30 years,” said Ralph Broetje during a recent teleconference organized by the National Immigration Forum, adding that last year Washington farmers — part of an $8 billion agriculture industry — were forced to leave 10% of their crops rotting on vines and trees. “It’s getting worse each year,” says Broetje, “and it’s going to end up putting some growers out of business if Congress doesn’t step up and do immigration reform.”¶ (MORE: Why Undocumented Workers Are Good for the Economy)¶ Roughly 70% of the 1.2 million people employed by the agriculture industry are undocumented. No U.S. industry is more dependent on undocumented immigrants. But acute labor shortages brought on by anti-immigration measures threaten to heap record losses on an industry emerging from years of stiff foreign competition. Nationwide, labor shortages will result in losses of up to $9 billion, according to the American Farm Bureau Federation.

#### Turns econ - Critical to US recovery

Aaron Terrazas, Migration Policy Institute, July 2011, The Economic Integration of Immigrants in the United States: Long- and Short-Term Perspectives, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/EconomicIntegration.pdf

The fate of immigrants in the United States and their integration into the labor market are impossible to separate from the state of the overall US economy and the fate of all US workers. During periods of economic expansion and relative prosperity, upward economic mobility among the native born generates opportunities for immigrants to gain a foothold in the US labor market and to gradually improve their status over time. In many respects, a growing economy during the 1990s and early 2000s provided ample opportunity for immigrants — and especially their children — to gradually improve their status over time. However, the story of immigrants’ integration into the US labor force during the years leading to the recession was also mixed: In general, the foreign born had high labor force participation, but they were also more likely to occupy low-paying jobs. The most notable advances toward economic integration occur over generations, due in large part to the openness of US educational institutions to the children of immigrants and the historic lack of employment discrimination against workers with an immigrant background. In the wake of the global economic crisis, there is substantial uncertainty regarding the future trajectory of the US economy and labor market. Most forecasts suggest that the next decade will be substantially different from the past26 and it is not clear if previous trends in immigrants’ economic integration will continue. The recession, weak recovery, and prospect of prolonged stagnation as a result of continuing high public debt, could realign the economic and social forces that have historically propelled the the less-educated labor force have been dismal for decades. In some respects, the recession accelerated these trends. While the prospect of greater demand for US manufactured goods from emerging markets might slow gradual decay of the US manufacturing industry, the outlook for the industry remains weak. Steady educational gains throughout the developing world have simultaneously increased downward wage pressure on highly skilled workers who, in the past, generated substantial secondary demand for services that immigrants often provide.

#### Decline causes terrorism—removes economic outlets that enable self-empowerment—that’s Harris and Burrows—our evidence is reverse-causal

Harris and Burrows ‘9 (Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groupsinheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, **particularly in the absence of economic outlets** that would become narrower in an economic downturn.

#### Turns relations – CIR key

Garza 12

(Antonio Garza, Former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico (2002-2009), “Viewpoints: What Should the Top Priority Be for U.S.-Mexican Relations?” December 03, 2012, Americas Society Council of the Americas)

The United States and Mexico have enjoyed a very healthy and respectful relationship. On issues of shared interest—primarily trade and security—we’ve cooperated, though mostly out of necessity. Yet neither country has ever truly leveraged the bilateral relationship strategically.

What will it take to bring about this kind of fundamental shift? A first step is to get rid of outdated perceptions—on both sides. You simply can’t expect to have a strategic relationship that functions in real time if perceptions lag present realities. There’s been new research and insightful commentary recently highlighting the gap between Americans’ perceptions of Mexico and the country’s current reality.

President Enrique Peña Nieto faces the daunting task of moving Main Street U.S. perceptions of Mexico closer to where the views of economists, investors, and discerning travelers are on the country. He will help this along by conveying his administration’s absolute commitment to carrying through promised economic reforms, implementing anti-corruption and transparency initiatives, and reinforcing cooperation on security.

For President Obama, it’s important to signal that his new team is completely schooled in the reality of today’s Mexico and that they are prepared to take advantage of the moment to recast the relationship to the benefit of both countries. Delivering on immigration reform and the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement are rare opportunities for a U.S. administration to fundamentally alter Mexicans’ perceptions of their northern partner. As Mexico’s place in the world rises and the U.S. continues to recalibrate its foreign alliances, there’s a unique opportunity to move the bilateral relationship to a more strategic level—but it will take some work.

### UQ

#### Will pass – GOP factions, Obama push

Fox News 10/28 (Fox News, “Republican Lobbying Groups Step up Push on House to pass Immigration Reform”, 10/28/13, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/10/28/republican-lobbying-groups-step-up-push-on-house-to-pass-immigration-reform/)

Republicans who back immigration reform are ramping up their push to get the House to bring legislation to the floor, as the issue threatens to potentially create a public divide within the GOP.¶ The Wall Street Journal reports the group Republicans for Immigration Reform is building up its lobbying efforts in Washington, releasing a web ad last week urging the House to act that has been viewed over 600,000 times, according to the group.¶ This week, the New York Times reports a coalition of about 600 mostly Republican leaders in business and agriculture will begin an effort to lobby 80 GOP representatives on the issue. Some GOP donors are also reportedly privately withholding their contributions from members of Congress who oppose action of immigration reform.¶ The issue has the potential to divide GOP lawmakers again after public in-party fighting over the recent budget negotiations.¶ The New York Times reports that while some House members and House Speaker John Boehner are pushing for the lower chamber of Congress to pass its own immigration legislation before the end of the year; some conservative lawmakers have said they will not act on the issue regardless of pressure.¶ “I care about the sovereignty of the United States of America and what it stands for, and not an open-door policy,” Rep. Ted Yoho, R-Fla., who is opposing all of the bills the House is currently considering, told the New York Times.¶ However, both President Obama and Boehner expressed optimism last week that the House could pass immigration legislation.¶ Obama on Thursday told an audience of business, community and labor leaders that the time to pass the Senate-passed reform bill is now, and urged the House to do so soon.¶ “Everybody knows our current immigration system is broken; across the political spectrum people understand that,” he said. “We’ve known that for years it’s not smart to invite some of the brightest minds in the world to study here and not start businesses here and we send them back to their home countries to create jobs, invent new products someplace else.”¶

#### House passage is likely—now key

Dan Nowicki, USA Today, 10/20/13, Time running out for immigration reform, www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/20/hopes-dim-for-immigration-reform/3062199/

Immigration reform, the centerpiece of President Barack Obama's second-term domestic agenda, lost momentum amid the partisan brinkmanship that led to the government shutdown. Some reform opponents believe the profound lack of trust between House Republicans and the White House all but ensures the issue won't proceed this year.

Obama, however, last week signaled that he is not surrendering on one of the issues he ran on when he was first elected president in 2008.

In an interview with Univision's Los Angeles affiliate, Obama indicated he will press forward on immigration reform immediately after the dust settles from the fiscal fight and demand that House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, and other Republican leaders allow a vote on a Senate-passed comprehensive bill.

"And if I have to join with other advocates and continue to speak out on that, and keep pushing, I'm going to do so because I think it's really important for the country," Obama said. "And now is the time to do it."

Reform supporters have remained optimistic that the GOP-controlled House of Representatives will consider several immigration-related bills in November. Their hope is that the House will pass legislation that could lead to negotiations with the Democrat-controlled Senate. On June 27, the upper chamber passed a comprehensive bill that includes a massive investment in border security and a pathway to citizenship for many of the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants who have settled in the United States. Most observers believe, as a practical matter, lawmakers have at most a few months to act on immigration reform before Congress is paralyzed by 2014 midterm election politics.

But many of the crucial pieces of immigration legislation in the House, such as a bill that could address the legal status of undocumented immigrants already settled in the United States, have yet to surface.

Recognizing time is running out, immigration activists and reform advocates are pressuring lawmakers in pursuit of a breakthrough before Thanksgiving or, at the latest, mid-December.

Reform supporters say if the House delays action on immigration reform until 2014, it's as good as dead because there will be little appetite to debate such a hot-button issue in a congressional midterm election year. If that happens, there likely won't be another serious legislative push until after the 2016 presidential race.

Despite the distractions of the recent Syria crisis and the bitter fiscal fight, reform proponents say they are heartened by the fact that influential House Republicans are still inclined to press ahead with legislation. Majority Leader Eric Cantor of Virginia and House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte of Virginia have been crafting a bill that would address the legal status of the young undocumented immigrants commonly called "dreamers" while Rep. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, the 2012 GOP vice-presidential nominee and a possible 2016 White House candidate, is said to be working on a proposal directed at the broader undocumented population.

#### House has the votes and Boehner will allow a vote

Houston Chronicle, 10/18/13, Next battle: Immigration reform, www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/Next-battle-Immigration-reform-4908248.php

Now that a deal on the budget has been reached, reform is back again, and the need is as urgent as ever. President Barack Obama vowed several times last week that he would be pushing for a vote on immigration reform legislation. Our hope is that House Speaker John Boehner, perhaps newly emboldened after defying a rump group of ultra-conservatives and surviving, will bring the bill to a vote on the House floor.

Earlier this month, House Democrats introduced their own version of an immigration bill that largely mirrors bipartisan legislation the Senate passed in June by a vote of 68 to 32. Both pieces of legislation would allow some of the nearly 12 million undocumented immigrants in this country to eventually achieve citizenship, provided they pay taxes and learn English. As the business leaders who visited the Chronicle emphasized, clarifying the status of the undocumented is likely to boost the economy and add jobs.

Many House Republicans profess to believe in the need for reform but balk at citizenship, which would relegate millions to a permanent underclass. Another option is something modeled on Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program.

Despite the concerns about citizenship, a House majority exists in support of reform, but Boehner has said he will not allow a vote if he doesn't have the support of the majority of his party. As with the debt-ceiling debacle, a minority of the House holds the process hostage - unless the speaker takes charge.

### AT: XO

High skilled visas can’t be resolved by executive action – legislation is key

Patrick Thibodeau, senior editor at Computerworld covering the intersection of public policy and globalization and its impact on IT careers, 11 [“High-skill visa reform needs action by Congress, Obama says,” Computer World, October 11, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9220740/High\_skill\_visa\_reform\_needs\_action\_by\_Congress\_Obama\_says]

Computerworld - WASHINGTON -- President Obama's administration has been tweaking U.S. immigration policy and making small changes where it can to try to encourage the type of immigrant it wants.¶ But Obama on Tuesday said that real changes to high-skill immigration policy will require action from Congress**.**¶ "On the high-skill immigration area, that's not something that we can necessarily do on our own," Obama said at a meeting of the President's Council on Jobs and Competitiveness.¶ "We can expedite some of the visas that are already in place and try to streamline that process to make it move faster," the president said, but "we may need some legislative help on that area."¶ The leading Democratic reform effort so far is by U.S. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.). Her bill would give a green card to any foreign student who graduates with an advanced degree in science, technology, engineering or math, but her bill is not getting Republican support. In the Senate, U.S. Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) has been promising an immigration reform bill, but he has yet to produce one.¶ Tom Kalil, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy deputy director for policy, said Obama has several goals for skills-based immigration.¶ The president has "explicitly called for, number one, increasing the number of green cards for high-skilled workers," Kalil said in a briefing with reporters regarding a new program for entrepreneurs offered by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).¶ Kalil said the president also supports a specific visa for immigrants who create start-ups. Obama additionally supports improving the education of U.S. students in technical areas, Kalil said, citing the president's goal of increasing the number of U.S. engineering graduates.¶ USCIS Director Alejandro Mayorkas said providing green cards to foreign graduates with advanced degrees "is the perfect example where legislation is needed."

### LINK

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

### AT: winners win

#### Wins don’t spillover—capital is finite and decreases—prioritizing it is key to 100-day agenda success

David Schultz, professor at Hamline University School of Business, 1/22/13, Obama's dwindling prospects in a second term, www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2013/01/obamas-dwindling-prospects-second-term

Four more years for Obama. Now what? What does Barack Obama do in his second term and what can he accomplish? Simply put, his options are limited and the prospects for major success quite limited. Presidential power is the power to persuade, as Richard Neustadt famously stated. Many factors determine presidential power and the ability to influence including personality (as James David Barber argued), attitude toward power, margin of victory, public support, support in Congress, and one’s sense of narrative or purpose. Additionally, presidential power is temporal, often greatest when one is first elected, and it is contextual, affected by competing items on an agenda. All of these factors affect the political power or capital of a president. Presidential power also is a finite and generally decreasing product. The first hundred days in office – so marked forever by FDR’s first 100 in 1933 – are usually a honeymoon period, during which presidents often get what they want. FDR gets the first New Deal, Ronald Reagan gets Kemp-Roth, George Bush in 2001 gets his tax cuts. Presidents lose political capital, support But, over time, presidents lose political capital. Presidents get distracted by world and domestic events, they lose support in Congress or among the American public, or they turn into lame ducks. This is the problem Obama now faces. Obama had a lot of political capital when sworn in as president in 2009. He won a decisive victory for change with strong approval ratings and had majorities in Congress — with eventually a filibuster margin in the Senate, when Al Franken finally took office in July. Obama used his political capital to secure a stimulus bill and then pass the Affordable Care Act. He eventually got rid of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and secured many other victories. But Obama was a lousy salesman, and he lost what little control of Congress that he had in the 2010 elections.

#### Even if a confrontational strategy is key, that doesn’t mean the plan’s singular win spills-over—it’s more likely to undermine Obama’s careful strategy on that issue

Ryan Lizza, 1/7/13, Will Hagel Spike the G.O.P.’s Fever?, www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/how-much-will-the-nomination-of-chuck-hagel-hurt-obamas-second-term-agenda.html

But Obama’s victory has made almost no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of the members of the G.O.P. who matter most: the House Republicans. The idea that a bloc of conservative, mostly Southern, Republicans would start to coöperate with the President on issues like tax policy and immigration may have rested on a faulty assumption. The past few weeks of fiscal-cliff drama have taught us that “breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor. There is no one event—even the election of a President—that can change a political party overnight. Congress is a co-equal branch of government, and House Republicans feel that they have as much of a mandate for their policies as Obama does for his. Shouldn’t House Republicans care that their views on Obama’s priorities, like tax cuts for the rich and immigration, helped cost Romney the White House and will make it difficult for their party’s nominee to win in 2016? In the abstract, many do, but that’s not enough to change the voting behavior of the average House Republican, who represents a gerrymandered and very conservative district. A better metaphor for the coming battles with Congress may be what Woody Hayes, the college-football coach, famously called “three yards and a cloud of dust”: a series of grinding plays where small victories are earned only after lots of intense combat. While the fiscal-cliff showdown demonstrated that there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making in the Senate, passing any Obama priority through the House of Representatives is nearly impossible unless the political pressure is extremely intense. The fiscal-cliff bill passed the House only when Speaker John Boehner’s members realized that their only alternative was blowing up the settlement negotiated by Joe Biden and Mitch McConnell—and accepting all the blame and consequences. That episode offers the White House a general template for the coming fights over spending, immigration, and gun control—three issues where there is very little consensus between Obama and most House Republicans. Deals will have to be negotiated in the Senate and gain the imprimatur of some high-profile Republicans. Then a pressure campaign will have to be mounted to convince Boehner to move the legislation to the floor of the House under rules that allow it to pass with mostly Democratic votes. It’s easier to see how this could happen with the coming budgetary issues, which have deadlines that force action, than for the rest of Obama’s agenda, which is more likely than not to simply die in the House.